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Abstract
Is there a relation between street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement style and their per-
ception of the risk of getting blamed? This article answers this question on the basis of a
survey (n¼ 507) among inspectors of the Netherlands Food and Product Safety
Authority. We included perceived media attention on their work as a factor that
might influence street-level bureaucrats’ perception of blame risk and their enforce-
ment style. Three dimensions of enforcement style were distinguished from earlier
research: legal, facilitative and accommodative. We found that when inspectors per-
ceive more blame risk, they employ a slightly less legal style and, instead, employ a more
accommodative style. Thus, they act a little less formally and less coercively (i.e. legal)
and take greater account of their peers’ opinions (i.e. accommodative). However, per-
ceived media attention did not have a significant influence on enforcement style.
Corresponding author:
Erik Hans Klijn, Department of Public Administration and Sociology, Erasmus School of Social and Behavioral
Sciences, Erasmus University, Mandeville Building T-17-41, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam,
The Netherlands.
Email: klijn@essb.eur.nl
International Review of Administrative
Sciences
0(0) 1–19
! The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0020852319899433
journals.sagepub.com/home/ras
Points for practitioners
1. When inspectors perceive more blame risk, they tend to pay more attention to the
opinion of peers (other inspectors, supervisors, etc.).
2. Blame risk does not lead to the use of a more formal inspection style.
3. Media attention does not play an important role in enhancing the blame risk
perception of inspectors.
4. This media and blame risk is less important than often found in the case of politicians.
This may be connected to the fact that the work of inspectors as street-level
bureaucrats is less visible to the wider public (and the media).
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Introduction
Inspectors are typical street-level bureaucrats with considerable discretion
and autonomy, who enforce policies during interactions with inspectees. During
these encounters, inspectors risk being blamed for their actions (Gilad et al., 2018;
Hood, 2011).
Hood (2011), whose seminal book has become a major reference in the literature
on blame, points out that blame risk and its negative consequences can be found at
all levels of administration, from politicians to street-level bureaucrats, such as
inspectors. However, very little research actually focuses on street-level bureau-
crats. Recent literature focuses more on citizens who blame political actors and
other actors in policy processes (see, for instance, Marvel and Girth, 2015; Olsen,
2017; Piatak et al., 2017), or on how politicians react to blame (Baekkeskov and
Rubin, 2017; Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015; Nielsen and Baekgaard, 2013).
Moreover, blame risk itself, as an actor’s perception, is rarely directly measured.
This is remarkable because inspectors and their regulatory organizations are
repeatedly under scrutiny, not just by politicians, but also by the media, inspectees
and the public. An example of regulators being held responsible and receiving a
great deal of blame is the horsemeat scandal in 2013, where horsemeat was found
in beef products in European Union countries such as the UK, The Netherlands
and France. The scandal led to massive criticism in the media and society, as well
as in the political sphere, regarding the regulatory agencies in those countries
(Ibrahim and Howarth, 2017; The Guardian, 2016).
Blame risk as a conditioner of inspector style
The risk of blame (‘blame risk’) influences the way in which organizations work
and how their members behave (Hood, 2011). The literature on blame risk and
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blame avoidance – a behavioural strategy of actors who perceive blame risk –
emphasizes that actors act differently and apply certain blame avoidance strategies
to counter the possible negative effects of blame (Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015;
Hood, 2011; Nielsen and Baekgaard, 2013). As Hood (2011) argues in The Blame
Game, street-level bureaucrats, such as inspectors, are regularly blamed for what
they do. Moreover, the recent trend towards more transparency and the disclosure
of performance information about public organizations is argued to increase the
risk of blame as the performance of street-level bureaucrats becomes more visible
and, in turn, open to scrutiny (De Boer et al., 2018; Ellerman, 2006; Van Erp,
2011). An interesting – but not well-researched – question is thus how the perceived
blame risks of street-level bureaucrats (in our case, inspectors) influence their
behaviour during inspections, particularly their enforcement style (May and
Wood, 2003). Given the blame risk literature (and especially Hood’s work), we
expect a significant influence of blame risk on inspectors’ enforcement style.
This study: inspectors’ blame risk perception and its consequences
According to Lipsky (1980), street-level bureaucrats such as inspectors have
considerable discretion in the implementation of rules and regulations.
Inspectors enforce rather than implement public policies when encountering
inspectees. Their enforcement attitude has been substantially studied using the
concept of enforcement style. An inspector’s enforcement attitude is complex
and consists of multiple dimensions that can be combined or highlighted separately
to assess inspectees’ compliance (De Boer, 2019; Lo et al., 2009; May and Winter,
2011). In this article, we study whether inspectors’ perception of blame risk influ-
ences three dimensions of their enforcement style. We thus study one specific, but
often discussed, driver of street-level bureaucrats’ behaviour. We also look at an
important context of blame risk: the media attention that their work receives. We
focus on the media’s role for two reasons: first, in the blame risk and blame
avoidance literature, media attention is treated as an important possible trigger
of blame risk (Hood, 2011; see also, e.g., Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015); and,
second, the literature on media attention emphasizes that it has a certain negativity
bias in that negative news attracts more attention than positive news does
(Bennett, 2009; Esser and Str€omb€ack, 2014; Mazzoleni and Schultz, 1999).
This suggests that a high level of media attention implies increased attention on
regulatory failure (instead of regulatory success) and, accordingly, increased blame
risk. Thus, we look at perceived media attention as a variable that possibly
increases blame risk. Our research question is: How do inspectors perceive blame
risk, and to what extent does this influence the enforcement style that they employ?
This study focuses on inspectors from the Netherlands Food and Consumer
Product Safety Authority (NVWA). These inspectors are concerned with food
safety and perform on-the-spot inspections of organizations such as restaurants
and the fish and meat industries. For the analysis, we conducted a survey among
all NVWA inspectors (507 respondents).
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This article first presents a theoretical framework in the second section, focusing
on the concept of blame risk and how it affects enforcement styles. The theoretical
framework also addresses a possible source of blame risk often mentioned in
the blame risk literature: media attention on inspectors’ work. Then, the article
elaborates on the research design in the third section and the results in the fourth
section. We end with conclusions and reflections in the fifth section.
Blame risk, blame avoidance and inspector styles: A theoretical
framework
In the blame world, public individuals, such as politicians, public managers and
also street-level bureaucrats (Hood, 2011), can and will be held personally account-
able for possible mistakes, wrongdoings or crises, which, blame risk authors argue,
will affect their behaviour (Ellermann, 2006; Nielsen and Baekgaard, 2013;
Weaver, 1986). In this section, we discuss the mechanism of blame risk and how
it could affect inspectors’ enforcement style. We first elaborate on the blame
risk concept and the possible consequences for actors’ behaviour, as discussed in
the literature. We then turn to enforcement styles and elaborate how these could
be affected by blame risk. We also discuss a possible important factor influencing
inspectors’ blame risk perceptions: the media attention that they perceive on
their work.
The mechanism of blame risk and blame avoidance
Hood (2011: 6) argues that what public officials are dealing with is the risk of
blame: ‘the act of attributing something considered to be bad or wrong to some
person or entity’. Being blamed is often experienced as a negative phenomenon;
therefore, people try to reduce the blame risk, and this behavioural reaction is
called blame avoidance behaviour (Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015; Hood, 2011;
Weaver, 1986). Hood (2011: 7) argues that blame involves two sets of actors –
blame makers and blame takers – and blame risk can come from many sources,
such as oppositional politicians, the public and, last but not least, the media
(Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015).
According to the blame avoidance literature, public officeholders care about
blame risk because of their psychological traits and because they think it affects
their personal career prospects (Hood, 2011; Nielsen and Baekgaard, 2013). Blame
risk arises at every level of public organizations: managers, professionals and
street-level bureaucrats. Hood emphasizes that blame avoidance is an inherent
characteristic of life in general, and certainly public life. He argues that variations
in concern about blame are part of the social setting in which individuals function.
Thus, the importance of blame risk is not constant, but varies with aspects such as
organizations’ culture and leadership, the external attention on a specific behav-
iour, and also probably the type and visibility of tasks done (Ellermann, 2006;
Hood, 2011). Hinterleitner and Sager (2015) emphasize that blame risk depends on
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both institutional (mainly related to the political system) and non-institutional
factors (like the type of issue and media attention).
The lion’s share of the blame risk and blame avoidance literature is about
political officeholders, who are under much stronger scrutiny than others.
This makes our research – which focuses on street-level bureaucrats, who are,
for instance, less visible and less prone to media attention than elected officials,
Hood (2011: 30–31) argues – all the more interesting.
Scholars argue that blame avoidance is central to understanding the behaviour
of public officials (Hood, 2007; Weaver, 1986). Blame avoidance is, then, the
behavioural consequence of blame risk and, according to most of the literature,
stems from the fact that potential losses (blame) are weighted more heavily
than potential gains (credit) (Weaver, 1986). Blame avoidance thus results in defen-
sive (political and bureaucratic) behaviour. Various behavioural strategies for
blame avoidance are discussed in the literature. Hinterleitner and Sager (2017)
discuss differences between anticipatory and reactive forms of blame avoidance.
Hood (2007, 2011) makes a distinction between agency strategies, presentational
strategies and policy strategies, but almost all authors argue that blame avoidance
influences how street-level bureaucrats perform their jobs (Hood, 2011) – what we
call their ‘enforcement style’.
Behavioural consequences: blame avoidance and its effects on
enforcement style
Inspectors are not mechanical implementers of policies; they have autonomy in
their daily tasks and certain room to implement policies in ways they see fit
(Lipsky, 1980). As Lipsky emphasizes, bureaucrats cope with various kinds of
pressures, such as scarcity of time and resources, and the inadequacy of informa-
tion (Hill and Hupe, 2009; Lipsky, 1980). This particularly holds for inspectors,
who, as public officials, have to ensure that societal actors comply with public
regulations and sanction accordingly.
Enforcement style can be studied at the organizational or the individual level
(May and Winter, 1999, 2011). These two levels of enforcement are interrelated
because the organization sets the boundaries within which individual bureaucrats
execute their enforcement. As the focus here is on the individual level, enforcement
style is defined as ‘the character of the day-to-day interactions of inspectors when
dealing with representatives of regulated entities’ (May and Wood, 2003: 119).
Although enforcement style was traditionally seen as one-dimensional (Kagan,
1994), there is now consensus that it is multidimensional. However, there is
some disagreement about whether it is composed of two or more dimensions
(e.g. De Boer, 2019; Lo et al., 2009; May and Winter, 1999, 2011). May and
Winter’s (1999, 2011) conceptualization has long been the most followed.
They define enforcement style as being composed of formalism and coercion: the
former concerns sticking to rules rigidly and a degree of flexibility, whereas the
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latter concerns threatening with sanctions. However, May and Winter themselves
note that there may be even more dimensions.
Recently, scholars have followed up on this idea and started to explore whether
enforcement style has more than two dimensions (De Boer, 2019; De Boer et al.,
2018; Lo et al., 2009). De Boer’s (2019) work is devoted solely to developing a
measurement instrument and identifying the number of underlying dimensions.
De Boer (2019) draws on Lo et al. (2009), who identify a total of five dimensions
of enforcement style in a Chinese context, and she convincingly shows that there
are three dimensions in a Western context. The first dimension, labelled ‘legal’, is
composed of both formalism and coercion. To illustrate, an inspector could artic-
ulate the consequences of non-compliance to inspectees. The second dimension is
‘facilitative’ and ‘encompasses the communicative function . . . of the law while
considering circumstances at hand’ (De Boer, 2019: 9). To illustrate, an inspector
can provide an inspectee with a tip on how to improve compliance when he/she
feels that the inspectee may benefit from that. Lastly, the ‘accommodative’ dimen-
sion is more cognitive in nature and addresses the degree to which opinions of
others, such as supervisors, are considered when the inspector conducts the inspec-
tion visit. An inspector could, for instance, consider that their team leader is very
polite during inspections and, in turn, also be very polite themselves. These three
dimensions can be combined in varying constellations and to varying extents, and
constitute an inspector’s total enforcement style. This study follows this most
recent conceptualization in the enforcement style literature.
From the literature on blame risk and the shaming of street-level bureaucrats, it
can be expected that the risk of receiving blame is an important condition (Hood,
2011; Van Erp, 2011). We therefore explore how blame risk possibly influences
enforcement style. Various authors argue that a well-known blame avoidance
strategy is protocolling (see, for instance, Hood, 2011). In this strategy, actors,
especially street-level bureaucrats, stick very strongly to the rules in order to avoid
any blame afterwards. This strategy of hiding behind rules is also mentioned in
earlier research about bureaucracy and bureaucratic behaviour as a possible strat-
egy to cope with criticism (see, for instance, Kiser, 2010). Thus, given the literature
on bureaucracy and blame avoidance, we may expect that more perceived blame
risk leads to a more formal enforcement style. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1a: When inspectors perceive more blame risk, this will correlate with a higher score
on the legal dimension of their enforcement style.
However, applying a more legalistic style may not be inspectors’ only reaction to
blame (risk). They may also use what Hood (2011) has called a more presenta-
tional strategy, in particular, using argumentation strategies to decrease the pos-
sibility of blame or to frame behaviour in such a way that they cannot, or cannot
easily, be blamed. In the facilitative style, inspectors explain more to inspectees
about both the rules that are applicable and their own decisions. Therefore, using a
more facilitative enforcement style is an anticipatory blame avoidance strategy to
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reduce the possible risks of blame (Hinterleitner and Sager, 2017). This is in line
with research which shows that citizens attribute less blame when they receive more
information about the context (Piatak et al., 2017). Thus, our second hypothesis is:
H1b: When inspectors perceive more blame risk, this will correlate with a higher score
on the facilitative dimension of their enforcement style.
The blame risk literature mentions another important blame avoidance strategy
deployed by street-level bureaucrats to diminish blame risks, called ‘herding’.
The aim of this strategy is to shield them from possible challengeable decisions
by sharing responsibility with others (Hood, 2011). This can be done, for instance,
by taking decisions not separately, but in a group, as well as by including super-
visors in decisions in order to shield oneself from possible blame later on. Several
authors (Hinterleitner and Sager, 2017; Hood, 2011; Weaver, 1986) argue that this
is a well-known strategy in a bureaucracy. This observation matches others on
street-level bureaucracy, for instance, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) and
Kiser (2010) emphasize that street-level bureaucrats, and especially their behav-
iour, are influenced by their peers and the micro-network in which they are located.
Reasoning from the blame avoidance strategy of herding likely means that inspec-
tors will pay more attention to the opinion of their peers (e.g. other inspectors, as
well as their superiors) if they perceive more blame risks. Accordingly, translating
this into a hypothesis, we expect the following:
H1c: When inspectors perceive more blame risk, this will correlate with a higher score
on the accommodative dimension of their enforcement style.
Media attention as a factor for blame risk
In the literature on blame risk, media attention is mentioned as a very important
factor that influences blame risk and especially increases the negativity bias that is
an important element of blame risk (see Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015: 146; Hood,
2011: 11). However, there is also a wide literature in the field of media studies
(Bennett, 2009) and agenda-forming studies (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009) that
emphasizes the negativity bias in the media and the tendency to blame and search
for ‘scapegoats’. The argument goes that, in general, more media attention leads to
more negative than positive attention (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Bennett,
2009). This focus on negativity can be explained by some of the institutional
rules of the media, which focus strongly on getting as many readers (newspapers),
viewers (TV or podcasts and videos) or followers (blogs) as possible. It is argued in
the literature on mediatization that negativity attracts more readers than positive
reports do (Bennett, 2009; Mazzoleni and Schultz, 1999). The media tends to be
more negative and often uses frames that embrace issues such as blame (Bennett,
2009; Hjarvard, 2008). Thus, the media amplifies negative bias and signals
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(Kasperson, 1992; Korthagen and Klijn, 2014), potentially leading to more blame
risk (Bennett, 2009; Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015; Hood, 2011).
The existing literature shows that intense media attention influences the behav-
iour of politicians and public managers (e.g. Corner and Pels, 2003) and has a
negative effect on governance performance (Korthagen and Klijn, 2014). Thus, we
also expect that media attention will increase the likelihood of inspectors perceiv-
ing more blame:
H2: When inspectors perceive more media attention on their work, they will perceive
more blame risk.
Figure 1 presents the conceptual model of this research.
Research design and measures
The conceptual model developed in the previous section was tested in a survey
among NVWA inspectors. The NVWA is tasked with regulating the safety of food,
consumer products, animal welfare and nature. Its authority ranges across numer-
ous sectors and many companies, for instance, the catering industry (about 80,000
companies) and slaughterhouses (about 200). It is one of the largest regulatory
agencies in The Netherlands (with 1,201 inspectors). Its size, which allows for a
large-n survey, and its prominent role as an inspection agency make the NVWA
an important actor that is relevant and suitable for studying blame risk among
street-level bureaucrats by way of a survey.
Data sample
The data for this research were collected through an online survey among inspec-
tors in the autumn of 2016. All inspectors work in three NVWA domains:
consumer and safety; agriculture and nature; and veterinary and import.
Those domains were selected because only inspectors in these domains conduct
inspection visits.
Figure 1. Conceptual model of the research.
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Out of 1,201 inspectors, 679 completed the questionnaire, resulting in a response
rate of 56.5%. From this group, we excluded 172 respondents who completed only
50% or less of the survey. This resulted in a final sample of 507 respondents.
Analysis of the demographics and division of respondents over the organiza-
tional units shows that the sample is representative of the entire population of
inspectors in this organization. The most important indicators are as follows:
• male/female¼ 72%/28%;
• average age¼ 48 years (SD¼ 12.9); and
• average work experience¼ 16 years.
We took several measures to ensure the validity of our data: first, we guaranteed
the respondents’ anonymity and confidentiality in order to prevent biased answers;
and, second, we validated the scales that we developed for this survey with 11 expert
interviews before the survey, including six inspectors and five senior staff members.
Data analysis
We analysed the data through multivariate regression analysis because this is
a proven and robust way to analyse relationships between multiple variables
(Field, 2018; Hayes, 2018). We applied Hayes’s process tool in SPSS as it is a
validated and well-recommended model for testing mediation effects (see, e.g.,
Field, 2018).
Variables in the analysis
The key variables to be explained are enforcement style, blame risk and media
attention.
Enforcement style. Following De Boer (2019), we measure enforcement style in three
dimensions: (1) legal, (2) facilitative and (3) accommodative. Each dimension was
measured with four or five items on a 10-point scale (1¼never; 10¼ always).
Thus, a high score on a dimension for an inspector means that their style is strong-
ly characterized by that dimension. The items are presented in Table 1.
Blame risk. Inspectors’ perceived risk of being blamed was measured by three items
on a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 10 (totally agree). These items were:
1. I run the risk that problems regarding an inspection by the NVWA will be
blamed on me personally by my manager.
2. I run the risk that problems regarding an inspection by the NVWA will
be blamed on me personally by colleagues on my team.
3. I run the risk that problems regarding an inspection by the NVWA will be
blamed on me personally by inspectees.
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In the survey, we thus measured inspectors’ perception of the risk of being
blamed. This is exactly what we wished to measure because it is the inspectors’
perceived risk of being blamed that initiates their action and influences their
enforcement style rather than any objective indicators of blame (such as the
number of mistakes measured in inspections) – of course, inspectors can also be
blamed even when they do not make mistakes, but simply apply the rules.
Media attention. Media attention was measured by two items: the amount of per-
ceived media attention by classical media (TV, newspapers and radio) and by
social media (Twitter, blogs, Facebook and forums). The question was: ‘Have
classical media/social media focused attention on subjects related to my division?’
Since it is not objective media attention that triggers how inspectors view the
risk of being blamed, but media attention perceived by inspectors, we measured
perceived attention (measured on a 10-point scale for both items). To create a
variable ‘total media attention’, the two scales (classical media and social media)
were combined into one scale. A low score meant that the inspector did not per-
ceive much attention on issues in their area.
Measurement issues
Data analysis was conducted through regression analyses with mediation, using
Model 4 in the process model tool developed by Hayes (2018) in SPSS
(Field, 2018). As preliminary analysis showed that the data departed slightly
from normality, we performed (bias-corrected) bootstrapping using 1,000 samples
(Field, 2018). The means, standard deviations and correlational data were
Table 1. Measurement items for the three dimensions of enforcement style.
Style Items
Legal
During inspections,
I focus on:
• implementing the intervention policy by following the letter of the law
• enforcing in an unambiguous way
• making strict agreements with [inspectees]
• executing the inspection as completely as possible
• upholding high standards for compliance with rules and regulations for
[inspectees]
Facilitative
During inspections,
I consider:
• transferring my professional knowledge to [inspectees]
• giving indications to [inspectees] on how to improve compliance
• being as helpful as possible to clients
• considering the circumstances of [inspectees]
Accommodative
During inspections,
I consider:
• the opinions of inspectors from my team about enforcing
• the opinions of inspectors from other teams about enforcing
• the opinion of my team leader about enforcing
• the opinions of directors/head inspectors about enforcing
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estimated via bootstrapping, as well as the standard errors, p-values and direct and
indirect effects in the regression analysis.
All variables used in this research have a good Cronbach’s alpha (see Table 2).
We used two control variables – years of experience and gender – because
these have been mentioned in earlier literature as important (see, for instance,
Kaufman, 2017).
Results and hypotheses testing
In this section, we present the results of the empirical analysis. We first look at the
simple correlations between the variables. After that, we present the results of the
regression analysis.
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics. We can see that inspectors have a high
average score on the legal enforcement style (8.1/10), and this enforcement style
also shows relatively little variance among the respondents (SD¼ 1.02). This shows
that, in general, inspections are strongly characterized by a legal style, especially if
Table 2. Cronbach’s alpha of the variables.
Measure Cronbach
Media attention (perceived) (2 items) .82
Blame risk (perceived) (3 items) .78
Legal style (5 items) .80
Facilitative style (4 items) .85
Accommodative style (4 items) .83
Table 3. Correlations between the main variables.
Variable (scales 1–10) SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Perceived blame risk 4.6 2.13 1
2 Legal enforcement style 8.1 1.02 .109* 1
3 Facilitative
enforcement style
7.4 1.40 .099* .310** 1
4 Accommodative
enforcement style
6.0 1.74 .142** .145** .333*** 1
5 Perceived media
attention
6.9 1.87 .025 .097 .007 .111* 1
6 Work experience
(number of years)
16.3 11.2 .100* .045 .107* .015 .087 1
7 Gender (m/f) 72%/28% .017 .043 .058 .107* .103* .386** 1
Notes: n¼ 507. **p< .001; *p< .05.
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we compare this with the average scores on the facilitative dimension (7.4) and the
accommodative dimension (6.0), which are (much) lower. Furthermore, the aver-
age level of perceived blame risk is relatively low (4.6/10), though there is quite
some variance here (SD¼ 2.13). However, it is obvious that blame risk is not
considered very high by inspectors; this is interesting given all the publicity
about scandals, as mentioned in the introduction, and news items about inspectors
being intimidated during their work.
There is a significant correlation between blame risk and the legal and the
accommodative dimensions of enforcement style. The first relation is negative
(when inspectors perceive more blame risks, they employ a less legal style), whereas
the second relation is positive (a higher perception of blame risk correlates with a
more accommodative style). There is a significant negative relation of the gender
control variable with accommodative style and with experience. Thus, female
inspectors are more likely to pay attention to the opinions of peers (other inspec-
tors and superiors) and inspectees. The relation with experience probably has to do
with the fact that the NVWA is an organization dominated by older male employ-
ees (female employees are better represented in younger age groups).
There are hardly any significant correlations between perceived media attention
and enforcement style. There is only a positive relation between perceived media
attention and the accommodative style: when there is more perceived media atten-
tion, inspectors tend to choose a more accommodative style.
Multivariate analysis of the data
As mentioned, we performed a regression analysis with mediation in SPSS analy-
sis. We analysed three models to study the direct and the indirect effects on each of
the dimensions of enforcement style. The results are presented in Table 4 and
Figures 2, 3 and 4.
The three figures show that there is no direct effect of perceived media attention
on enforcement style. Nor is there a mediation effect, that is, there is no indirect
effect of perceived media attention via perceived blame risk on enforcement style.
However, there are direct effects of perceived blame risk on the legal and accom-
modative enforcement styles.
Table 4 shows that all three models are significant even though their explana-
tory power is limited given the relatively low R2 (0.027 for Model 1; 0.023 for
Model 2; and 0.041 for Model 3). Table 4 also shows significant effects of perceived
blame risk on legal style (negative) and accommodative style (though the coeffi-
cient of the legal style is small), and an almost significant effect on facilitative style.
This result confirms H1c: when inspectors perceive a higher blame risk, they will
adopt a more accommodative style. As explained in the theoretical section, this is
logical: if inspectors perceive more blame risk, they are likely to pay more attention
to the opinions of their superiors and colleagues. However, it disconfirms H1a
because we expected a positive effect of perceived blame risk on legal style, whereas
we see a negative effect. Thus, inspectors tend to use a less legal style when they
12 International Review of Administrative Sciences 0(0)
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perceive risk; this is both interesting and unexpected. We reflect more on this in
the conclusion.
However, media attention has no significant impact either on enforcement
style or on perceived blame risk. Contrary to our expectations, (perceived)
media attention on inspectors’ work does not influence the perception of
blame risk. The weak relationship between media attention and blame risk
also explains why there is no mediation effect. As the confidence intervals
show, no indirect effect of media attention on enforcement style can be estab-
lished within the confidence interval of 95%. We suggest possible explanations
for this finding in the conclusion.
Figure 2. Results of the mediated regression analysis of legal enforcement style.
Figure 3. Results of the mediated regression analysis of facilitative enforcement style.
Figure 4. Results of the mediated regression analysis of accommodative enforcement style.
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Conclusions and reflections
This article analysed the relation between the blame risks that inspectors perceive
and their enforcement style. Additionally, the effect of perceived media attention
on enforcement style was studied as a factor that may influence inspectors’ per-
ception of blame risk. In line with the literature, we expected that when inspectors
perceived more blame risk, this would result not only in inspectors using a more
legal style, but also in an intensified use of a facilitative style and an accommoda-
tive style (Hood, 2011). Moreover, we expected that more media attention
would increase perceived blame risk given that media attention is often
mentioned in the blame risk literature as an important factor (Hinterleitner and
Sager, 2015; Hood, 2011).
Empirical findings and possible explanations
The first major and surprising finding is that blame risk leads not to a more legal
style, but to a less legal style, and although we did find the expected positive
correlations between blame risk and accommodative style, we did not find a sig-
nificant relation between blame risk and facilitative style. Despite the significant
relations (blame risk and both legal and accommodative style), the explained var-
iance is not very high, indicating that enforcement style is only limitedly explained
by blame risk. Blame risk does not prove to be the strong predictor of enforcement
style that we could have expected on the basis of the blame risk literature. Existing
research indicates that other factors (such as the disclosure of performance infor-
mation that we studied earlier (see De Boer et al, 2018)) explain more of the
variance in street-level bureaucrats’ behaviour than blame risk. We therefore sug-
gest a refinement and nuancing of blame risk theory, and argue that it should not
be too easily generalized from political officeholders to street-level bureaucrats.
Perceived media attention does not have any significant impact on either blame
risk or enforcement style; this is also contrary to our expectation and that of the
blame risk literature. The last finding is interesting because some of the literature –
though this is more aimed at elected officeholders’ blame risks (Hinterleitner and
Sager, 2015; Nielsen and Baekgaard, 2013) – suggests that blame risk is enhanced
by media attention on the issue, on the public organization or on the official
(Hood, 2011). If we look at our findings, this is obviously less so for street-level
bureaucrats, which may necessitate an adaptation of our theory about blame risk
and the media. A possible explanation is that there is considerable interaction
between inspectors and inspectees but that actual media attention on inspection
activities is only limited. Thus, media attention may be less important, both in
frequency of occurrence and in consequences, for inspectors than for elected office-
holders. The latter receive more intense media attention. News value is a crucial
factor for the media in selecting what to report (Bennett, 2009; Hjarvard, 2008),
and the news value of the enforcement behaviour of single inspectors is probably
lower than the news value of the behaviour of elected officeholders (politicians).
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This also means that we should look for other possible causes to explain the level
of blame risk in future research on street-level bureaucrats, for instance, causes
related to the nature and salience of the tasks of street-level bureaucrats, or the
direct relation between their work and the political arena.
Of course, the other outcome of our research – that more blame risk leads to a
less formal style of enforcement – is more difficult to explain. Possible explanations
might be related to the circumstances and context in which the NVWA as a reg-
ulatory agency has to operate. As shown in the survey results, the average score for
the legal dimension of inspection style is very high (8.1 on a 10-point scale, with
limited variance in the variable). This means that inspectors perceive their style as
already highly legal, and may therefore perceive limited possibilities for making
their style even more legal than it already is. Thus, this may encourage them to try
a slightly less legal style to reduce potential blame risk emanating from the inspect-
ees. Another explanation might be found in the fact that in the case of street-level
bureaucrats, the relation is actually quite different than what the literature sug-
gests. Due to their relatively intensive relation with inspectees, compared to most
other bureaucrats, inspectors may be inclined to try a more understanding
approach with less emphasis on rules in order to induce a more compassionate
and understanding reaction from inspectees and the wider environment, thereby
reducing the risk of blame. Thus, choosing a less legal style is actually seen as a
blame avoidance strategy by inspectors. The fact that we find a positive relation
with the facilitative dimension of enforcement style also hints at this way of think-
ing as a possible explanation for this. Given that we find a significant but not very
strong relation between perceived blame risk and legal enforcement style, more
research on this relation is needed to be sure of the relation and its possible
explanations.
Limitations of the research
Naturally, this research has limitations. Notwithstanding the advantage of a rela-
tively large sample size of street-level bureaucrats (n¼ 507), which enhances the
generalizability of the findings, we have only inspectors’ perceptions as data. Given
the strict rules and privacy policies in Dutch inspection organizations, it was not
possible to connect the survey to more objective data about inspectors (such as the
number of fines or warnings issued by inspectors to inspectees). As blame risk is
essentially a perception, and it is the perception of risk that drives inspectors’
behaviour, this is less of a problem in this case.
Other limitations are that we only studied one possible explanation of blame
risk: media attention on the inspectors’ work. For this study, we were mainly
interested in the effect of blame risk on enforcement style, but studying more
antecedents of blame risk is important to increase the understanding of blame
risk among public officials.
Of course, the risk of common source bias exists, which is a theme that
has received a great deal of attention lately (George and Pandey, 2017;
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Podsakoff et al., 2012). However, we did several things to minimize common
source bias, as mentioned in the literature (Podsakoff et al., 2012): first of all,
the survey was initially tested among inspectors; second, we presented the depen-
dent and the independent variable on different pages of the questionnaire; and,
finally, we secured cooperation for the research and motivated the respondents by
informing them through various channels of how important their participation
was. This resulted in a high response rate despite the warning from some of our
contact persons that NVWA inspectors are surveyed very frequently.
Despite these limitations, we believe that this study is valuable. To date, the
theoretical statements about blame risk and its resulting behaviour have hardly
been tested among street-level bureaucrats. Most of the literature and research is
based on case-study research, and there is a lack of systematic large-scale quanti-
tative research that provides generalized insights. Our results provide evidence that
blame risk is also relevant for street-level bureaucrats but it seems less so than
suggested in the literature, which focuses much more on (political) officeholders.
As some of our findings indicate, especially those regarding the negative relation
between blame risk and the formal dimensions of enforcement style, this is an area
in urgent need of further clarification in future research.
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